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Ever since man has found the need to defend himself
there has been a defense industry. Even if it was only to
fashion a club from a dead tree trunk, some sort of outward
action to produce defensive or offensive weapons has been a
fact of man's survival. At some point in time, man realized
that a profit could be made making implements of war for
others; hence, the modern defense-industrial complex was
born. In this day and age, the complexities of
technological advances and international relations
highlights the need for government involvement in both the
development and proliferation of state-of-the-art weapons
systems
.
During the first half of the 20th century, the United
States enjoyed the fruits of its late 19th-early 20th
century industrial expansion. This was especially true in
the realm of defense-related acquisitions. The U.S., for
the most part, was able to domestically produce all its
defense needs with little or no foreign manufacturing
assistance. There was little concern for the political
considerations of allies with respect to the American arms
industry. America could still defend itself with its own
domestic production capabilities regardless of outside
disfavor with American foreign policy.
Such is definitely not the case in 1989. The U.S. is
dependent on foreign sources for many of the components of
major weapon systems. This thesis will deal with one aspect
of this dependence--the semiconductor industry. In this
area alone, 23 major weapon systems contain semiconductors
available only from foreign-owned, foreign-located sources.
Some of these systems are at the forefront of the Reagan
military expansion: GPS (Global Positioning System) which
permits any military unit to geographically locate its
position to within several feet, the F-18 fighter-attack
aircraft, and the F-16 fighter-attack aircraft. [Ref. l:p.
22] The majority of these technologically advanced
semiconductors are produced in Japan; however, other source
countries include Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy
and South Korea.
When discussing the implications of foreign-based
producers of American defense components, one must consider
several relational components. In particular, what aspects
of our national security are at risk when foreign suppliers
enter the market? Is it ever acceptable to rely on foreign
suppliers and, if so, to what capacity? What avenues are
available to preclude foreign domination of sensitive
technologies?
A. BACKGROUND
Many firms spend a considerable amount of effort and
expense reverse engineering products from other companies.
However, the effort and expense in developing new technology
is considerably higher by comparison. The incentive for
firms to develop these new technologies is not always
sufficient to warrant the investment. A substantial amount
of the benefits of their investment in new technology can be
readily captured by imitators. Hence, looking at the issue
from a broad viewpoint, research and development is not
always the most cost-effective means to achieve a profit.
This is accentuated even more when foreign suppliers, who
often times have governmental backing in investment and tax
credits, are able to manufacture high-tech items at a
fraction of the cost to American producers.
Take the Japanese for example. They have developed a
long-term joint effort between government and industry to
become a world leader in semiconductors. [Ref. 2:p. 4]
These actions include:
- home market protection though Buy Japanese
requirements;
- subsidization of cooperative R&D. The Japanese
government provided funding, as of 1987, for over 60
major projects related to semiconductor research;
- industry actions to develop a highly integrated and
interdependent industry structure.
The U.S., on the other hand, also provides substantial
support to domestic high-tech industries through substantial
DOD subsidies.
Whether or not one can conclude that these actions were
a major contributory factor in eventual Japanese domination,
the facts speak for themselves: semiconductors are the
principle and dominant component of Japanese microelectronic
production today. In particular, Japan holds 90% of the
world's share in the 256K DRAM market and is planning on
marketing very shortly its own 1MB DRAM [Ref. 2:p. 3].
However, one must remember that DRAM production, relative to
other types of semiconductor production, is on the low-
technology end of the spectrum.
The West has nothing to compare with this level of mass
production for the merchant semiconductor market. Where is
the incentive for U.S. firms to invest heavily in R&D when
they can either purchase the products directly or reverse
engineer the products themselves? In either case, short-
term costs are reduced. However, dependence on foreign-
based sources will only be exacerbated if this continues.
B. NATIOMMi RISKS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCY
The issues of national risk are two-fold: the direct
threat of a disruption in supply (either through willful
embargoes or blocked transportation routes) , withholding
crucial defense produces, and the spillovers to the defense
and domestic economy as a whole, specifically concerning the
ability of Americans to successfully exploit and understand
leading-edge technology.
Should foreign suppliers continue to expand in the
American defense arena, American foreign policy could be
severely compromised, according to the Defense Science Board
[Ref . 3:p. 94] . What would prevent the government of a
country in which critical U.S. components are manufactured
from stopping production/export in response to
dissatisfaction with American foreign policy, they ask?
Contingency plans for just such a scenario have already been
developed for strategic raw materials. Much of the U.S.'
strategic minerals (i.e., chromium, nickel, platinum, etc)
come from such countries as South Africa, Brazil and
Australia. The U.S. has been stockpiling strategic minerals
for years in the event that these sources are prevented from
fulfilling their contracts for whatever reason, political or
military blockage.
The area of high-technology dependence, however, is more
expansive. In this situation, the raw material in question
could be considered to be the semiconductor. If dependent
on foreign sources, this raw material would not be present
within the borders of the U.S. to the degree required.
More importantly, though, according to many industry and
government officials, the ability to design, produce and
even use these components could gradually dissipate. [Ref.
2:p. 2] The U.S. could conceivably become similar to many
Third-World nations who currently rely on U.S. technological
training for their state-of-the-art military expansion.
This dependence on foreign-based sources also precludes
a great deal of spillover into other aspects of the national
economy. Spillovers include such aspects as the increased
electronic emphasis in many of today's consumer products or
the use of hybrid materials in the auto industry. Economic
studies have shown that the rate of return of R&D to society
as a whole is double the return to the individual firms
performing it [Ref. 4:p. 4]. This means that as R&D
increases domestically, it can be expected that a plethora
of offshoot industries will benefit. Specifically
concerning the semiconductor industry, R&D in universities
and industry help preserve the U.S. base level of human
knowledge, thereby ensuring future domestic engineering
exploitation and expansion.
Concerning the question of whether it is ever acceptable
to rely on foreign suppliers, one must consider two issues:
are there alternative foreign sources for the same product
and what is the extent to which the product is of vital or
non-vital importance to national defense?
If a product had only one source, say Japan, and if the
supply routes from Japan to the U.S. were disrupted, then a
shortage could ensue. However, if there were multiple
sources for the same product (i.e., Korea, Taiwan, Mexico,
etc) , then the likelihood of all sources simultaneously
becoming unavailable becomes increasingly unlikely. In this
situation, therefore, it might be permissible to rely on
foreign sources.
For the second issue, one must determine the extent to
which the product in question is of vital or non-vital
importance to national defense. For example, if tactical
training in the future relied critically on the ability to
geographically locate oneself within a few feet, then the
GPS network would be vital to successful prosecution of a
conflict. Should the foreign supplier fail to provide
necessary vital components for maintenance or establishment
of the GPS network, for whatever reason, then American
defense readiness would be in doubt. This could have severe
repercussions in an aggressor's perception of his ability to
win a conflict with the U.S.
On the other hand, if radios for Army jeeps were
procured from foreign sources, any blockade of this supply
line could probably be overcome with replacement by domestic
models, assuming no specialized components were required.
In this case, the non-vital radios could continue to be
supplied by foreign sources with no threat to national
security. The determination of vital vs non-vital
components is one that would need to be made at the highest
levels of DOD.
C. ALTERNATIVE POLICIES TO REDUCE TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCY
If it is determined that foreign-source domination of
key defense related components is not in the national
interest, what are some of the alternatives to remedy the
situation? Clearly, precedence has been set with the
imposition of tariffs, quotas and anti-dumping legislation.
In addition to these negative measures other more positive
actions could be: strategic stockpiling. Buy American DOD
policies, dedicated DOD production facilities and federal
subsidies for domestic production. These alternatives may
answer the short-term, limited aspect of DOD concerns;
however, the crux of the matter is that these measures are a
stopgap at best.
A major area of emphasis that this thesis will explore
is that of various federal intervention practices with
regard to domestic industrial production: protectionist
policies and their effects on the defense industry. When
dealing with trade restrictions, the term protectionism
inevitably comes into play. Protectionism is the regulation
of exchange by noncontracting parties. Generally, it is
governmental regulation of the terms or conditions on which
one person may trade with another. More specifically, and
how it is normally defined in the macro sense, it is the
regulation of trade between the residents of different
countries for the supposed benefit of certain home-country
residents
.
Various methods of regulation have been devised,
including the following:
- tariffs--schedules of duties on imports, not as
prevalent as in past years due to international
agreements;
- non-tariff barriers
additional charges—above and beyond the normal
customs duty, on certain imports;
import quotas—which directly limit the amount of a
commodity that may be imported during a given
period of time (consumers do not enjoy lower prices
when import quotas are enacted while domestic
producers essentially receive a quota profit in
addition to maintaining a secure and less
competitive market for their product)
;
export quotas--in the name of national security,
certain products are restricted in both numbers and
destination if exported (one of the more publicized
examples was the ban on sale of various computer
systems to Eastern Bloc nations imposed by the
Reagan administration)
;
voluntary export restrictions--rather than risk
even sterner measures, some countries voluntarily
restrict exports to other countries (Australia, New
Zealand and other beef producing nations
voluntarily restricted exports of beef to the U.S.
from 1968-1971 rather than trigger automatic quotas
under the Meat Import Act; Japan voluntarily
restricted its export of cotton textiles to the
U.S. during the 1950s and, most recently, Japan cut
back on its exports of automobiles to the U.S. in
reaction to U.S. pressure;
Buy American rules--since the Great Depression,
various legislation has required government
agencies to buy their supplies from domestic
sources unless any additional cost is deemed
unreasonable;
anti-dumping legislation--dumping refers to the
sale in foreign markets of products below prices
charged in home markets for the same products
(according to Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
, such sales are only
considered unfair and subject to anti-dumping
duties when they are also injurious to U.S.
producers of similar products)
.
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other measures, though not commonly recognized as
protectionist in nature, are: exchange controls and
multiple exchange rates, licensing requirements, health and
sanitary standards and customs-valuation procedures. Each
of these areas will be thoroughly explained as to their
impact on the defense industrial base, positive or negative
as it may be.
In the case of the semiconductor industry, DOD accounts
for only 3% of total domestic output of semiconductors [Ref.
l:p. 9]. Because of this, efforts to promote DOD
independence from foreign suppliers do not necessarily
enhance the domestic industrial production capabilities as a
whole. What the Federal government has proposed, and what
this thesis will explore, is the concept of federal
involvement in a combined DOD-industry research consortium.
Known as SEMATECH or Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology
Institute, this consortium would enable the semiconductor
industry to perform basic and advanced research into various
semiconductor manufacturing techniques, an area of
increasingly diminished U.S. ability. As envisioned, the
Federal government's involvement will be limited to initial
structure of the organization and follow-on funding for the
six years currently planned for the organization's first
11
project. Numerous problems, both from the organizational
viewpoint and the financial one are yet to be resolved, yet
SEMATECH promises to be a major player in the domestic
semiconductor industry.
The remaining portion of this thesis is divided into
seven main areas: an historical background of various
protectionist policies is provided in Chapter II; a variety
of national security implications relating to domestic
manufacturing production will be expounded upon in Chapter
III; an examination of the research consortium as a means of
resolving the research and development problems associated
with foreign competition is discussed in Chapter IV; an in-
depth analysis of SEMATECH research consortium, the
federally backed semiconductor consortium recently organized
in Austin, Texas is provided in Chapter V; a summation of
conclusions elicited from the data researched is presented
in Chapter VI; and Chapter VII lists several areas for
further research.
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II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE FOR PROTECTION OF
DOMESTIC INDUSTRY
Government intervention in trade policies of individual
industries in the U.S. in varied and widespread.
Consequently, it is not unexpected to believe that a
protectionist bent would be likely in as vital an industry
as semiconductors. In this chapter, a number of examples of
just such protection will be examined along with the
consequences they had for their respective industries. The
protectionist policies considered include tariffs. Buy
American regulations, anti-dumping legislation, and
governmental subsidization.
A. REASONS FOR PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT
Protectionism is the regulation of exchange by
noncontracting parties. Generally speaking, it has come to
mean the regulation of trade between the residents of
countries to the benefit of certain home-country residents.
Reasons for protectionist sentiment are varied, yet specific
to the situation in which a nation finds itself. Some of
these reasons are:
13
- to protect against cheaper foreign goods, which are
made possible because of foreign government
subsidization or cheaper foreign labor. These cheaper
goods supposedly will take away market share from
domestic producers of these same goods;
- to support domestic industries in order to save jobs at
home
;
- to prevent monopolization of an industry by foreign
firms through dumping actions;
- to ensure overall health of domestic economy;
- to ensure a national product standard;
- to prevent national security problems from occurring.
Each of these reasons has specific, and often times
overlapping, means of achieving their goals. These terms
are explained further.
B. MEANS OF PROTECTION
Examples of protectionist methods are as varied as are
the industries they protect. One of the most preponderant
methods has been via tariffs. Tariffs are duties imposed on
imports. The lowering of tariff barriers due to
international agreements in recent years has avoided this
volatile political method. However, to replace the void,
varied non-tariff modes have been developed. The European
Economic Community (EEC) imposes variable levies on
agricultural products which it imports from countries
providing government farm subsidies. Obviously this is to
14
protect the EEC farmers who do not necessarily enjoy the
subsidies of their peers in other countries. [Ref. 4:p. 3]
Another example is in the domestic distilled spirits
industry of the U.S.. Here, while an excise tax is imposed
on all distilled spirits, it is imposed in such a manner
that foreign made products end up paying proportionately
higher rates than domestic producers. In this case, while
Americans are taxed based on the proportion of proof of
their products, foreign spirits are levied a flat rate for
all products of 100 proof or less. In some cases, Americans
may pay only 50% of the tax a foreign producer does for the
exact same product. [Ref. 4:p. 3]
Buy-American rules are also another means of restricting
the use of foreign products. Legislation has been passed at
numerous points in U.S. history requiring Federal agencies
to only use domestically produced products even if it meant
paying a higher price [Ref. 4:p. 7] . In some cases, DOD
accepts higher prices for domestically produced products,
even if they are 50% more expensive than equivalent foreign-
made products
.
Anti-dumping legislation has provided some of the most
publicized and emotional examples of protectionism found
anywhere. These laws permit domestic industries to require
15
higher duties on foreign products by showing the existence
of foreign subsidies or injury due to below-fair-value sales
of these products in the U.S.. It is believed that the
foreign producer is attempting to drive out the domestic
producer by underselling him. Ultimately, once this is
accomplished, the foreign producer will allegedly monopolize
the industry and begin charging higher prices because no
competition now exists. Anti-dumping legislation became
such a widespread problem that international trade
agreements finally were required to curb its abuse and
legitimize the context in which it could be enacted.
However, Article VII of GATT, which clarified anti-dumping
circumstances, is thought by some to overly favor domestic
producers at the expense of domestic consumers [Ref. 5:p.
70] . There is no evidence to believe that Japanese TV
manufacturers are attempting to drive Zenith or RCA out of
the U.S. TV market because they sell their products at lower
prices than their U.S. counterparts. It could be simple and
rational profit-maximization behavior. Unfortunately, this
may not always be the case.
Even if the avowed reason is not to necessarily drive
U.S. producers out of the market, some types of dumping can
certainly do this. Case in point: the massive influx of
16
cheap semiconductors by the Japanese in the early 1980s.
Having mastered an inexpensive mass production technique,
Japanese firms sold huge amounts of their products on the
U.S. market to the dismay of domestic producers. Not only
could they not compete, many of the smaller firms went
bankrupt. Finally, Congress investigated and determined,
based on Article VII of GATT, that dumping did occur which
warranted anti-dumping legislation.
An interesting example of direct government intervention
in protecting a domestic industry would be that of the
British Government and ICL (International Computers Ltd) , a
British computer firm. The United Kingdom provides two
types of subsidies to the computer industry--industry-wide
and firm-specific. ICL competes with numerous American-
owned firms which have subsidiaries on British soil such an
Honeywell, NCR, IBM, etc. In addition, numerous smaller
British-owned firms operate in the United Kingdom. The
governmental industry-wide subsidies apply to all computer
firms which gain income inside Great Britain, irregardless
of ownership. This subsidy is to encourage importation of
advanced technology into the British market. Firm-specific
subsidies benefit only British-owned companies; hence, ICL
enjoys double subsidization. The problem with this type of
17
double standard is the danger of alienation of the foreign
firms to the point of their withdrawal. A fine balance
continues to be met in this situation. [Ref. 5:p. 55]
British Airways provides yet another example of direct
governmental involvement in protectionism. Since British
Airways is a nationalized firm, essentially owned by the
British taxpayer, it is of substantial interest to Her
Majesty's Government to encourage as much domestic
involvement as possible in all aspects of its operations.
This includes the procurement of aircraft. Since there is
no substantial domestic commercial passenger aircraft
industry in Great Britain, British Airways looked for
foreign-produced aircraft. In a bid between three U.S.
firms (Boeing, McDonnel Douglas, and Lockheed) and a Franco-
German consortium, Boeing ultimately won. However, British
Airways insisted that Boeing use Rolls Royce engines in
these planes. This certainly increased the eventual price
to British Airways, but it also directly aided a domestic
British firm--protectionism at its best!
Nor is protectionism limited to industries of a strictly
commercial nature. For example. West Germany strongly
subsidizes their aircraft, space, nuclear and computer
industries on the basis that they contribute significantly
to the overall health of the German economy and are too
sensitive to allow free market control . The problem with
this reasoning is the ability to correctly ascertain what
constitutes significant contribution. In each of these
industries a national defense argument could be brought
forth, and rightly so, by German government. In the case of
the American semiconductor industry, just such an argument
is especially germane.
Protectionism is not simply limited to saving a
particular domestic industry from unfair competition, but
also as a means of enforcing a national product standard.
For example, after the '73 Arab Oil Embargo, Americans began
turning away from their traditional big cars and looking
seriously at purchasing a small car. At the time, Detroit
was unable to satisfy this American desire and consumers
increasingly began looking at foreign-made products. Some
of the most fuel efficient small cars in the world at that
time were Fiat's 500 and 600 models. However, the U.S.
refused permission for domestic sale of these models because
they did not meet national safety standards [Ref. 5:p. 60].
This determination was very fortunate for Detroit indeed,
since it would have been unable to compete realistically.
These standards exemplify the two guiding principles behind
19
a policy of setting national product standards: (1) the
belief that domestic products are higher in quality than
foreign goods; (2) that the consumer must be saved from his
own ignorance of this fact through protectionist rulings.
The U.S. is not alone in using protectionism to enforce
a national product standard. The French believe that they
are entitled to good wine, which means only French-grown
wines are allowed in French government circles. The Dutch
prohibit the sale of any product containing corn syrup
because of supposed health concerns. This may appear
innocent enough since it encompasses domestic as well as
foreign suppliers. However, upon closer inspection, this
ban effectively restricts the importation of chocolates,
fruit purees, pastes, most jams, jellies, marmalades, etc.
These are some of the very products that the Dutch are well
known for themselves. Therefore, since foreign imports are
essentially nonexistent, the domestic industry can thrive
without competition.
C. PROTECTIONISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY
One argument which has aained substantial legitimacy,
especially in recent years, is that of the national defense
aspect of certain domestic industries. Arguments center on
the fact that some import-competing industries may not be in
20
the position to provide for the national defense need in
case of all-out war. If the competing import had the
advantage economically over its domestic counterpart then
there would be the perpetual danger of a reduction in
imports due to any number of wartime scenarios. If this
import were deemed militarily significant, the U.S. would be
at a disadvantage. [Ref. 6:p. 15]
Is there a precedence for just such a supposition? Has
the U.S. been in such a position and what were the outcomes,
if any? The following examples will help to clarify just
such questions.
One of the most recent examples of the danger to the
national security is the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. The almost
50% dependence of the American economy on imported oil
resulted in unprecedented rises in the price of petroleum
products which quickly spread to all aspects of the national
economy. As a result of the embargo, a small import fee was
imposed. Prior to this, import quotas were imposed. In
retrospect, even though these quotas were imposed to
encourage domestic production, they also encouraged the
draining of the most easily recoverable oil fields at just
such a time when imported oil was relatively inexpensive.
In the long run they may have harmed the very industry they
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were designed to protect and placed the U.S. in a position
of extreme vulnerability. In this case it can be argued
that protectionism did more harm that good.
D. CHOICE OF PROTECTIONIST POLICY
As explained in the preceding section, there are
numerous types of protectionist policies. However, matching
these with the problem at hand is the difficult issue.
Government officials must weigh the potential fallout from
inhibiting the free market in their economy against the
survival of their own domestic industries. For example,
import quotas for DRAMs, negotiated with the Japanese in
1986, had significant adverse effects on the computer and
electronics industries, but did not seem to help the U.S.
DRAM industry [Ref. 7:p. 552],
Some choices are more apparent that others. Obvious
dumping practice by a foreign firm might reasonably warrant
anti-dumping measures. On the other hand, a simple tariff
might be more reasonable if government wishes to encourage a
fledgling domestic industry from being overrun by foreign
competition at its inception. If government wishes to
maintain domestic preeminence in a certain field, it may
decide to subsidize that industry (i.e., U.S. agricultural
subsidies) . Whatever the reason, the choice must fit the
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circumstances. It would be considered inappropriate for a
government to enact anti-dumping legislation for a product
which caused no injury to domestic industries. It also may
not be appropriate for a nation to impose tariffs for fear
of counter tariffs against unrelated vulnerable domestic
products which have foreign markets.
In any case, these decisions ultimately rest on the
politician's judgment, based on the perceived facts. The
major points here are that the semiconductor industry has
appealed to each of the major reasons for protectionist
sentiment listed. Some of these appeals drew attempted
remedies which, for the most part, have failed. The latest
appeal has been the national security fear of foreign
dependence and its implications.
Since the argument of national security is so vital to
the logic behind creation of SEMATECH, an in-depth analysis
of just what national security implications are present is
needed. Chapter III will describe the defense technology
base, the national technology base and how national security
is connected to both.
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III. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
The previous chapter discussed various justifications
for protectionist policies which governments could, and
have, used to support measures to ensure viability of
domestic industries. One of these reasons used potential
national security degradation as the basis for inhibiting
foreign-made products from entering the national economy.
The semiconductor industry is using just such an argument in
the development of SEMATECH. An examination of the various
issues relating to these national security implications will
now continue.
A. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE
When discussing national security and technology, one
must necessarily define the defense technology base. This
is the combination of people, institutions, information, and
skills that provides the technology used to develop and
manufacture weapons and other defense systems. It depends,
to a great extent, on the interrelationships between
national laboratory facilities, commercial and defense
industries, venture capitalists, universities and other
science and engineering professionals. It also draws on the
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work of scientists in other countries and is both formal, as
through written contracts, and informal, as through
seminars, contacts within specialized communities, etc.
B. DOD TECHNOLOGY BASE PROGRAMS
The DOD technology base programs are not the same as the
defense technology base. The defense technology base is, as
explained above, an accumulation of scientists and
engineers, knowledge and facilities while the DOD technology
base programs are a group of individual projects funded
specifically through DOD's budget.
The Department of Defense has organized its technology
base programs into three basic categories: (1) basic and
applied sciences; (2) exploratory development of practical
applications of that basic research; (3) the manufacturing
of prototypes to demonstrate the results of application.
The road to obtaining satisfactory results from each of
these categories is substantially different and applicable
mainly within the DOD environment. More relevant are the




C. DIFFICULTIES IN UTILIZING DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY BASE
The defense technology base gleans its data from the
national technology base as a whole, since it theoretically
has access to all ongoing research and development.
However, this is not necessarily the case. A number of
situations limit the availability of research for defense
purposes. [Ref. 8:p. 15] Commercial industries developing
new technology tend to be reticent in giving up their best
technology immediately (DOD policies to encourage
competition in acquisition essentially require firms to make
proprietary technology available to competitors in the form
of technical data packages) . Cutting edge technology,
therefore, is not always available to DOD as quickly as
would be desired. Some scientists have moral qualms
concerning defense related research and refuse to
participate, creating a dearth of top-notch scientists in
some fields. Finally, governmental regulations are often
times so confusing to companies with no prior defense
experience that they become very reluctant to participate in
such endeavors. Therefore, while theoretically able to draw
from the entire national technology base, in fact, the
defense technology base is somewhat restricted.
26
D. DEFENSE AND NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BASE
Only a handful of large defense contractors do the
majority of defense related research in the U.S.. These
defense contractors, by and large, primarily design, develop
and produce weapons and other defense systems and can be
considered part of a defense industrial base. This defense
industrial base draws on its own internal technology as well
as technology developed elsewhere. In other words, the
defense industrial base is a subset of the larger national
industrial base. The national industrial base is comprised
of both commercial and government-sponsored industries. In
some areas, the commercial aspects of research lags behind
the defense aspects; however, in others it is just the
opposite, the commercial sector is well ahead of the defense
sector. DOD exerts considerable influence over those
contractors with defense background, but very little on
those which spend their efforts primarily in the commercial
sector. Defense is an extremely small part of their overall
revenue infrastructure. The market dictates the extent and
rapidity of their technical growth. These so-called "dual
use" industries are a vital part of the overall national
industrial base and, consequently, the defense industrial
base. The semiconductor indi:istry is a prime example of just
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such a dual-use industry. Although primarily a civilian-use
product, semiconductors play a basic role in all defense
systems. The availability of such products transcends
simply the commercial field; it is a substantial concern to
national security.
E. UNITED STATES NEED FOR TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY
One of the principle means of keeping the U.S.
militarily ahead of the Soviet Union has been through the
use of technologically superior weapons systems. For years
this has enabled numerically inferior NATO forces to balance
numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces. However, in recent
years, indications are that this edge is beginning to erode.
Through a variety of mechanisms, the technology advantage
which the U.S. has enjoyed has diminished to near parity
with its opponents. Is this a cause for concern? And if
so, what particular industries are of main importance? Both
issues shall be studied accordingly.
For over three decades, the U.S. has relied on
technological superiority as the crux of its national
defense planning. If the tj . s . cannot maintain this
technological lead there are only a few choices to be made,
assuming no fundamental changes in competition between
America and her rivals: (1) accept a significantly
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decreased level of security; (2) rely more on allies; (3)
make major increases in military forces. [Ref. 9:p. 109]
F. TECHNOLOGY LEAD
When discussing technological lead, one can consider a
variety of levels. However, ultimately the advantage is.
realized only on the battlefield, in fielded military
hardware. Maintaining a technological lead in fielded
military hardware is much more difficult than catching up.
Maintaining a lead requires an innovative and dynamic
national technology base whereas catching up can be
accomplished through imitation. Imitation is much less
expensive than innovation because it can essentially use all
the tricks in the book, including espionage, reverse
engineering and buying technology. The Soviets, in
particular, have "significantly reduced the lead previously
held by the U.S. and its allies in technologies of military
importance" [Ref. 9:p. 110].
American commercial and defense technology tends to be
complex and costly. Successful innovation requires that
substantial amount of time be spent training operators and
maintenance personnel for the new equipment as well as
getting the "bugs" out of every new system. Less time and
money is therefore available for production technology.
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Efforts are focused on design technology. Herein lies the
issue at stake in the semiconductor industry. Although
American basic research technology is virulent,
manufacturing expertise continues to be the Achilles heel of
the commercial and defense semiconductor technology base.
G. AN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL BASE
The issue of availability of strategically vital
products brings to the forefront the question of foreign
dependence. This is inextricably intertwined with the
increasing international competitiveness of important
civilian high-tech industries. Since the U.S. is part of
the global economy, it may be cost effective, some say, to
buy what it needs from this global market. In certain high-
tech industries, other nations lead the U.S. both in
production and basic research of products vital to important
defense systems. Partially due to the substantial economic
aid to allies after World War II, this phenomenon has the
potential to undermine America's own economy if
protectionist policies become the norm, say many economists.
[Ref. 8:p. 22]
The problem with this situation is that there may be
trade-offs between the best economic choice (foreign
sourcing or domestic sourcing) and national security. While
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giving DOD the control and certainty desired, total domestic
sourcing most likely will risk losing access to important
technological developments which are produced overseas or
which can only be produced in this country at a prohibitive
cost. More and more, the global economy is witnessing such
phenomenon as international cooperative development projects
(i.e., Iguazu Dam between Brazil and Argentina, SST between
France and England, etc) , co-production agreements (FSX in
Japan), and licensing (P-3s in Japan and F-16s in Israel)
.
As more of these actions occur, the national economies will
become more and more intertwined and interdependent.
Synergism, therefore, takes place when the strengths of
various national economies are focused on a common project.
H. NATIONAL SECURITY CHOICES
Assuming one believes the premise that it is permissible
to share defense production, and even to rely on foreign
sources for certain vital defense needs, the question
becomes a matter of choice. Which industries are so vital
that foreign sources cannot be permitted to dominate and
which are not as vital? Similarly, if foreign sources are
acceptable, which source or combination of diverse sources
will minimize the national security risks? Ultimately,
these are political decisions, but ones which must be based
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on both the realities of the present economic and political
global situation and on a reasonable forecast of future
conditions
.
Semiconductors have a long tradition of dominance for
the American portion of the global economy. It is not
surprising, therefore, that U.S. industrialists and
government officials, accustomed to being number one in this
field, would feel that national security is in jeopardy if
foreign firms should dominate. Investing time and effort to
encourage legislative approval for foreign sourcing may be
very difficult, politically, as compared to an American
source option.
Therefore, foreign dependence can be either harmful or
good, desirable or not desirable, avoidable or unavoidable,
or a mixture of these. The circumstances under which one
option or another might be undertaken must take all these
facets into consideration. Unfortunately, no clear cut
answer is ever possible in these situations.
The following chapter will examine the increasingly
popular phenomenon of the consortium. What is it, how did
it begin and what are the implications for American
industry? The semiconductor industry is relying heavily on
just such an organizational form. SEMATECH, with its
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emphasis on semiconductor manufacturing technology is the
most recent semiconductor consortium. Earlier on-going
consortia include the Semiconductor Research Corporation
(SRC) , which emphasizes basic semiconductor research in
universities, and the Microelectronics and Computer
Technology Corporation (MCC) , which emphasizes applied
semiconductor and computer research. Are consortia, in
fact, the best forum for resolving the industry's problems?
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IV. THE CONSORTIUM: PANACEA OR BUST?
As mentioned in the previous chapters, protectionist
sentiment is varied and full of emotion at times. To say
the least, it can stir heated arguments in international
circles and make bedfellows of hawk and dove alike. Another
topic of controversy is the increasing resort to, and
effectiveness of, the consortium in American industry.
Since DOD is funding just such an organizational form, via
SEMATECH, a discussion and explanation of the benefits and
dangers from consortia will follow. Initially, a breakdown
of the various types of consortia will be listed, organized
by the goals each has. Secondly, the issues unique to
consortia, such as technology transfer and setting of
agendas, and their relative historical success, will be
shown, while a comparison of matching types to activities in
both the U.S. and Japan will follow.
A. CONSORTIA STRUCTURES
The basic organizational structures of consortia are
somewhat varied but can generally be identified in one of
three ways [Ref. 10:p. 64]. These include consortia
designed solely to conduct long-term research, those
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associated with universities, and finally, those formed to
promote uniform standards in their industry.
The first category includes those consortia organized to
conduct long-term research. These have full-time permanent
employees as well as loaners from the member companies who
work for a period of time and then return to their parent
firm, presumably taking with them the technology developed
via the consortium. Examples of this are Bell
Communications Research, Inc (Bellcore) , a cooperative
program between Bethlehem Steel and U.S. Steel,
Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC)
,
and finally Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology
(SEMATECH)
.
The second category more closely resembles the pre-1984
type of consortia: those organized to conduct or encourage
research through university-type settings. Usually these
consortia have very small staffs and no laboratories
themselves. They provide funding and set basic goals to
focus the research. Examples include Semiconductor Research
Corporation (SRC), a group of about fifty hi-tech firms
interested in furthering basic research on semiconductors in
universities, and Computer-Aided Manufacturing
International, which is a consortium of over 100 firms
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interested in improving industrial productivity in computer
systems and software. Another example is the Geothermal
Drilling Organization which sponsors research into
techniques for improving drilling and geothermal
exploration. The main theme behind these consortia is the
emphasis placed on external organizations (universities and
the like) for their research.
The third category includes those consortia that test
for adherence to standards or regulations or which develop
and promote certain standards. Examples include: the
Center for Advanced Television Studies (defining an ideal TV
transmission system) , the DEET Joint Research Venture
(sponsors research on the effects of the pesticide known as
DEET and provides results to Congress and other legislative
bodies for incorporation into regulations concerning DEET'
s
use) , National Association of Home Builders Research
Foundation-Smart House Project (designed to coordinate home
control and energy distribution systems with
telecommunication and enhanced safety features) . Other
examples are the Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association of
the U.S. and the Plastics Recycling Foundation which sponsor
research into measuring automotive fuel emissions and
improved recycling of all plastic materials, respectively.
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B. COMMON ISSUES
Consortia have a body of issues which are common to
other forms of industry organizations. However, they must
also deal with a set of circumstances (both beneficial and
disadvantageous) which are unique only to them. First, the
benefits industry gleans from consortia will be explained.
Then, two of the more critical issues, agreeing on a common
agenda and transferring technology to member firms will be
discussed.
C . BENEFITS
Because the consortium brings together a diverse set of
similar firms, not every firm will benefit exactly as the
others. However, generally speaking, the following points
are common to all consortia:
- individual firms will spend relatively less for the
technology coming from the consortium than they would
if the same research were conducted internally;
- a pooling of intellectual talent permits more
innovative technologies to be realized at a faster pace
than otherwise expected for internal R&D efforts;
- smaller firms will generally gain relatively more from
their participation because their own R&D funding would
probably never come close to matching the consortium' s;
- huge, nation-wide proiects, such as the Manhattan
Project or Apollo Moon Program would be very difficult
to achieve without a consortium-like organization.
[Ref. 10:p. 63]
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These benefits must be weighed against the potential
problems and disadvantages which consortia also possess.
D. AGENDA FORMATION
Setting an agenda is not easy task for the consortium.
It must take a diverse set of individuals, many of whom are
successful experts in their fields, and agree to common
goals, timetables for achieving them, and methods to employ
along the way. Furthermore, consortia members want to
ensure that the cooperative research projects are somehow
coordinated with their own internal research projects. Some
consortia send representatives who meet and decide for their
respective firms as a group on an as needed basis. Other
consortia choose a core of semi-permanent individuals who
are authorized to act on the firm's behalf at the consortium
site itself. This is not an easy task as member firms often
times have different visions on where their industry should
expand. It takes a dedicated and adroit facilitator to
coalesce these sometimes divergent viewpoints into a
compromise agenda.
E. TRANSFERRING TECHNOLOGY
Each type of consortium also has its own unique
mechanisms set up for transferring technology. However, it
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is easiest for the second category of consortia to do so.
These firms, which provide funding for university research,
usually would provide funding for this same research on
their own. It is, therefore, in their best interest to
jointly support a more expanded research effort by members
having the same basic goals. Leverage is gained by joining
forces. For the type of basic research sponsored by this
category of consortia, technology can be transferred
relatively successfully, through conferences, seminars,
symposiums, and research papers.
These types of consortia are generally successful,
however, they can fail if management is incompetent or the
firms are forced to support research they do not want.
Neither of these cases are commonplace, though.
The third type of consortia has the hardest time dealing
with the issue of technology transfer. Here the basic
question is whether or not firms which normally compete can
agree on standards which would affect their individual
firms. They must accept as true the premise that what is
good for the industry is also good for their individual
firm. This can be a hard pill to swallow for some.
The Corporation of Open Systems (COS) is an example of
how this technology is successfully transferred. Formed to
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support legislation or protocols to enable different
computers and electronic equipment to be interconnected, COS
sets standards which member firms must then engineer into
their individual products. This centralized standardization
has provided savings for American industry since individual
firms need not devote substantial R&D for applicable
software. The first set of standards was implemented in
1987 and is available to member firms free of charge (via
dues required) and for a substantially higher fee to non-
members. [Ref. 10 :p. 65] COS appears to be working
successfully thus far. Only time will tell if it remains
viable in the long run.
The technology transfer question is a critical issue for
the first category, those firms banding together for long-
range R&D purposes. Once competitors agree on the research
agenda, will they accept the results? Furthermore, as
technology becomes more product and process oriented, the
know-how becomes more embedded in individual researchers.
This makes it harder to transfer through conferences,
seminars, and technical papers.
An example of how one consortium has attempted to
resolve this issue can be illustrated by examining MCC. MCC
was organized by a group of American computer firms to
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counter the threat from the Japanese Fifth-Generation
Computer Program in 1982. Once the research agenda was
codified, technology transfer problems had to be rectified.
MCC's technology transfer policies include technical
reports, formal written notices to member firms, and
employees returning to their parent firms with new
technology in hand. For example, over 800 technical reports
have been disseminated to member firms in more than 30
technologies. These include such areas as software,
algorithms, computer language, and equipment design. While
it can still be debated whether or not MCC was successful in
transferring its technology to member firms, an indication
of success is the amount of adoption of technology by member
firms. Examples include Honyewell's plan to use an
artificial intelligence program developed at MCC for
production of multilayer printed-circuit boards and Boeing's
plan to use packaging technology transferred from MCC in its
Seattle laboratories. In fact, the first commercially-
produced product using MCC-derived technology is NCRs Design
Advisor, an expert system for designers of integrated
circuits, placed on the market in June 1987, [Ref. 10:p. 66]
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F. OTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS
Resource pooling and elimination of wasteful duplication
are among the substantial benefits that first category of
consortia (MCC and SEMATECH) can potentially provide for
producing new technologies. However, agenda setting,
technology transfer, and other associated issues still
remain as potential problems.
Once again, the problem of member firm acceptance of
consortia-developed technology is not a trivial one. Many
firms are inherently distrustful of technology which is not
developed in their own laboratories.
Professional jealousies play a part as well. Company
researchers may tend to feel that consortium research is not
the same quality as their own. Also, they may tend to
resent this research especially because it may take away
from company internal research funding they would be
receiving instead. However, most of the large-scale
projects cannot be supported solely by a single firm. Joint
research is especially imperative and financially productive
in these cases. Furthermore, it is almost impossible for a
single firm to acquire the necessary talent to be able to
compete with other large sources such as universities and
government agencies.
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In short, this non-acceptance of consortia-produced
technology will continue to cause problems unless mechanisms
are implemented to counter it. One such mechanism currently
in use is that of shadow programs [Ref . 6:p. 15] . Shadow
programs are in-house programs which parallel or complement
work being done in the consortium itself. In this manner, a
company can trust, somewhat more, the external research
being provided.
G. UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH CONSORTIA
The use of consortia is not a new concept in the history
of American technology. The Aerospace Industries
Association, for example, was organized 30 years ago to help
develop software for numerically controlled machine tools.
Prior to this, the Manhattan Project and Radiation
Laboratory of MIT were organized to utilize scientists and
engineers for specific pro jects--both were highly successful
in their own right. In fact, the success of these projects
in developing nuclear weapons and radiation applications
proved to private industry the necessity of cooperation in
large endeavors. These projects simply could not have been
completed by only one or two scientists in one company.
[Ref. 10:p. 63]
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other examples of governmental involvement in large-
scale projects have been the Apollo Program, the Space
Shuttle Program, and the European Space Program. These
projects have had a tremendous impact on the way R&D has
been conducted in this country. The issue, however, is
whether or not this same intensity of effort can be
transferred to the private sector. The private-sector R&D
consortium, unlike its government-sponsored cousin, is
usually limited to an R&D function and does not have
production or manufacturing responsibilities. Therefore, it
is somewhat critical that the technology developed be
adopted by the sponsoring members for eventual inclusion
into their individual manufacturing processes. This is one
of the critical questions regarding the private-sector R&D
consortium concept. Will the sponsoring members accept the
technology developed through the consortium and how can it
be transferred effectively to all members? Prior to 1984,
universities played a prime role in the R&D arena.
Oftentimes at the center of the consortium, universities
were able to avoid the risk of being harangued on antitrust
grounds because of their prime emphasis on research rather
than production. However, with passage of the 1984 National
Cooperative Research Act this fear among private firms was
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essentially nullified. Since 1984, more than 60 registered
consortia have come into existence as compared to about 20
prior to 1984. [Ref. 10:p. 64]
H. JAPANESE CONSORTIA EXPERIENCE
Even though there are definite advantages to consortium
produced research, is it a viable entity for the private
sector in this country? Some would point to the alien
concept of cooperation in this country, as compared to Japan
and some European countries where long term support by
government and mutual cooperation among firms is somewhat
more common. The tendency in the U.S. has been for
consortium member firms to come in for a relatively short
period of time, expect high returns, and then depart. [Ref.
6:p. 15] The Japanese and European models point to a much
more patient approach.
If consortia are alien to the American culture, what
makes the Japanese model so successful? Perhaps the
emphasis they place on the problem or goal they wish to
achieve, and not on the actual organization itself, provides
a clue. The Japanese effort in the semiconductor field
tends to focus on specific objectives selected by a number
of independent firms and promoted by MTTI . The consortium
itself only exists for a predetermined period. Once the
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goals of the group have been met, the consortium disbands
totally. There are no reasons to maintain the consortium
intact, in the Japanese mind, if the pre-consortium
determined goals are achieved. [Ref. 7:p. 551]
I. CAN UNITED STATES CONSORTIA BE SUCCESSFUL?
With the points in this chapter as ingredients and menu
for the consortium soup, can the U.S. cook its own success
story? Perhaps, but it must take into consideration a
number of factors.
The consortium concept can still be considered to be
somewhat alien in this country. While the Japanese ethic is
"company first", Americans think of their "individual"
rights first as a whole. In order for consortia to become
effective in the U.S., the mutual suspicion of competitors
will have to be resolved. A concern, therefore, would be
that these consortia might produce highly specialized
products, unreasonably expensive and non-competitive with
foreign sources. Such is the case with many defense
contractors. Fortunately for them, they do not have to
compete on the open market. In essence, their market is
built-in for them.
The use of a MITI-type subsidization of an industry can
be effective if introduced at the appropriate stage.
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Support of these growing industries can cut prices, increase
consumption, and speed the sharing of R&D. In the early
1970s, for example, MITI began its support of the Japanese
chip industry, a growth industry at that time. U.S.
governmental intervention of an embattled industry such as
is the semiconductor industry currently, may not be as
effective, however. The dynamics of troubled industries,
where the firms involved have well established roles and
relationships, are quite different. In these situations,
consortia have never been proven effective. [Ref. ll:pp. 65-
66]
Governmental subsidization (MITI-like) might be an
effective mechanism in a new, upstart technology in the
U.S., though. Technology such as superconductivity, HDTV,
and stealth could all benefit because there is no dominant
force on the market at this time.
J. PREDICTIONS
As seen by the number and variety of consortia, this
form of conducting research by private sector firms is on
the upswing in the U.S.. However, is it really worth the
investment or are the individual firms simply protecting
themselves against being left behind the crowd should a
significant research breakthrough be discovered? In
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addition, the thorny issue of successful technology transfer
is not inconsequential.
Therefore, arguments that consortia are the wave of the
future simply because there have been upsurges in their
numbers in recent years is too narrow a view. American
industry may or may not be able to utilize this type of
format successfully. The independent entrepreneur, for one
example, would probably never agree to consortium-backed R&D
involvement. In fact, just this type of entrepeneurism has
brought about a great majority of high-tech products in use.
Hundreds of small American chipmakers have found a highly
lucrative niche in the specialized memory chip arena. This
arena may be where America is best able to utilize its
intellectual talent, the small, but innovative, custom chip
market
.
Analysis of the consortium as a possible R&D
organization leads one to conjecture concerning the types of
industries best suited for consortia R&D. In fact, one of
the most intensively research-oriented industries is
semiconductors. The marriage of semiconductors and
consortium-organized R&D seems too good to be true. Is it?
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The case for the government-subsidized, industry-backed
SEMATECH consortium will be addressed in the following
chapter.
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V. THE CASE FOR SEMATECH
Up to this point, discussions have dealt with rather
broad-based issues, albeit focusing of these issues has
become narrower and narrower: protectionism, national
security reasoning for protectionism, and the consortium as
one possible mechanism to enhance R&D in the U.S.. The
preceding chapter acknowledged the benefits of the
consortium and its synergistic effects on the member firms.
However, numerous problems were also shown to be possible,
depending on how the consortium is organized and managed. A
detailed study of just how the government-subsidized
semiconductor research consortium, SEMATECH, came to be and
its organizational make-up will now be addressed.
A. REASONS FOR DOMESTIC SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY DECLINE
While subject to much controversy and opinion as to why,
many well-meaning individuals argue that the American
semiconductor industry, as a whole, is now substantially
behind foreign-owned firms (especially the Japanese) in
total market share and overall viability. In their opinion,
this decline is mainly attributable to the loss of the high-
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volume DPAM market. This loss is believed to have been
caused by some of the following reasons:
- early Japanese government support for their domestic
semiconductor industry;
- Japanese governmentally imposed trade barriers
restricting Japanese market penetration by foreign
firms, mainly American owned;
- dumping practices;
- natural evolution via the life-cycle theory of trade
patterns;
- fundamentally different industrial practices between
Japan and the U.S. (i.e., MITI involvement with
industry)
;
- differences in industry structure (i.e., vertical and
horizontal integration by many Japanese firms)
.
While each of these reasons are important, the final two are
particularly interesting in that they point to a divergence
in overall industrial philosophy. If these were the primary
causes, it would provide an opportunity for comparing the
relative success of one system over the other. This shall
be examined later.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
For quite some time now, observers have been noticing
the rather steady decline in American competitiveness in the
semiconductor field. In particular, the subset of
integrated circuit production has been a controversial
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subject due to the once dominant level of worldwide
shipments which the U.S. enjoyed. In 1975, the U.S.
possessed 58% of worldwide merchant production of integrated
circuits. At that time, America's closest competitor was
Japan with only 19%. Since then, a combination of
occurrences has caused Japan to greatly increase her share
of the market to a 1986 level of 45%. During this period,
the U.S.' level has fallen to 45%. In other words, as of
1986, the U.S. and Japan were at parity in merchant
integrated circuit production. [Ref. 12 :p. 1] Even more
dramatic is the comparison of world market share of Dynamic
Random Access Memory (DRAM) chips. In 1975, the U.S.
controlled 90%, but by 1986 it had only 5%.
This would seem, to most free market economists, to
simply be a result of the natural competitiveness of the
free market system. The consumer could only benefit from
such actions, and in fact, he has. The cost per bit for
DRAM has substantially decreased from 1 cent/bit in 1973 to
1/1000 cent in 1985 [Ref. 12 :p. 5]. To a great extent this
has been caused by competition which resulted in better and
more abundant DRAMs
.
Because of the perceived market share loss by American
firms, the U.S. semiconductor industry has lobbied for
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legislative action to counter this decline. Unable to
compete successfully, the industry's most recent endeavor is
the creation and federal funding of a manufacturing research
consortium known as SEMATECH (SEmiconductor MAnufacturing
TECHnology)
. The reasons behind creation of such an
organization and its effectiveness to date shall now be
examined.
C. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REASONING
In early 1986, the Defense Science Board was
commissioned to study the issue of dependency of the
military on foreign-produced semiconductors. Based on
results of their inquiry, a recommendation was made to
support formation of a consortium of U.S. semiconductor
manufacturers. What brought the Board to this specific
conclusion?
The impetus behind this investigation was the growing
belief in foreign domination of so-called "generic"
semiconductor production. These generic chips, specifically
DRAMs, are ubiquitous throughout the computer industry.
That is, they are used by almost all types of computers
throughout the electronics industry. In particular, they
are important components in most advanced military systems.
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One of the basic premises stated in defense journals is
the strategic reliance of the U.S. on technological
superiority over its potential adversaries. This technology
relies primarily on weapon systems containing a high number
of electronic components. Of course, the reasoning
continues, electronics have the ubiquitous semiconductor as
their backbone. Since the semiconductor no longer is
produced primarily in the U.S., American defense products
necessarily contain foreign-produced components
(semiconductors)
.
The Defense Science Board concluded that this could lead
to a dangerous situation: American defense needs relying on
foreign sources. Two reasons for this conclusion included:
(1) in case of conflict, foreign governments might restrict
the sale of vital semiconductors to U.S. defense industries
if they disagree with American actions; or (2) the ability
to produce defense systems in general may degenerate to the
point where Americans would lose the know-how to apply
technology to defense needs. In either case, the results
were unacceptable according to the Defense Science Board.
If the hypothesis is that semiconductors are vital to
American defense needs, how is their availability to be
assured to defense contractors? Defense requirements for
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semiconductors are small compared to commercial requirements
(DOD accounts for only 3% of total DRAM sales) . If DOD
requirements are to be met, two possible outcomes are:
- utilize domestic, commercial semiconductor industry
production, taking steps to ensure that sufficient
capacity exists for national emergency purposes;
- accept foreign-source semiconductors.
If the second option is unattractive for the reasons
stated above, then it follows that the domestic commercial
industry must be encouraged to produce, in sufficient
quantities, the products that DOD needs. Domestic merchant
DRAM producers cannot currently meet these requirement. The
issue of captive market producers (i.e., IBM, AT&T) is
certainly a factor in deciding if there will exist a
domestic-based supply line available in time of war.
However, this concern will be addressed later.
A strong requirement by DOD alone will not cause
private, merchant market firms to invest the time or capital
to meet DOD's need by themselves. Since DOD accounts for
such a small portion of the market, private firms must be
attracted by the commercial benefits inherent in the
industry. SEMATECH proposes to do just that.
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D. REASONS FOR JAPANESE SEMICONDUCTOR ADVANCES
Some of the Japanese industrial practices which have
contributed to successful growth of their domestic
semiconductor industry have been:
- investment of a larger fraction of sales into plant and
equipment than U.S. firms (1970-1985);
- high emphasis on R&D investment as compared to U.S.
firms (13% vs 10%)
;
- R&D emphasis has been on technology development which
will bring long-term returns vice American R&D emphasis
on the shorter-term design of new products to be placed
on the market as rapidly as possible;
- a high degree of mutual cooperation between fiercely
competitive firms under the direction of the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) or Nipon
Telephone and Telegraph (NTT)
.
Differences in industrial structure are also important
to note: (1) most Japanese semiconductor firms are
substantially larger than their American counterparts; (2)
most Japanese semiconductor firms are vertically integrated
and horizontally diversified. Size and horizontal
diversification provides internal R&D funding on a much
larger scale, allows for economies of scale and permits
Japanese firms to weather the frequent severe downturns in
the semiconductor industry (non-semiconductor portions of
the firm can subsidize the semiconductor portion) . Vertical
integration allows the profitable computer and consumer
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electronics sales to subsidize DRAM production and
manufacturing technology development. Many Japanese firms
(Hitachi, NEC, Toshiba) consume up to 20% of their own
production. [Ref. 12 :p. 2]
In addition to the apparent differences in industrial
structure and practices, other more basic differences may
explain the surge in the Japanese semiconductor industry;
these may be related to overall economic and labor
variations. For example, lower productivity per worker, and
demand for higher wages in the U.S. work force place another
barrier in the industrial race for superiority. Also, the
tendency in the U.S. market to emphasize adversarial
relationships between labor, management, government, and
academia create reluctance for cooperation among these same
parties. This is just the opposite of what occurs in Japan.
Furthermore, employee loyalty is much greater in Japan.
This tends to mean the employee becomes experienced in his
field, while continuing the normal Japanese business
practice of rotation between departments. Experience and
loyalty engender a desire for quality which manifests itself
positively in the final product. Of course, this same
tendency for Japanese workers to remain in the same firm may
in turn quash innovation. This issue will be dealt with
later.
57
E. BENEFITS OF UNITED STATES SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTION
LEADERSHIP
While subjective by nature, several benefits are thought
by some to be particularly useful to the U.S.. These
include: the previously mentioned national security aspect;
R&D uses by other parts of the electronics industry; and
strengthening of the entire national economy, particularly
the science fields. Of specific interest is the
relationship of semiconductor leadership to overall national
economic standing.
Studies indicate that the rate of return to society of
R&D in electronics is greater than that to the individual
firms [Ref. 13]. This would include, according to
researchers, an increase in the domestic human talent pool
in the sciences due to utilization of these individuals by
high-tech industries. Conversely, the decline in numbers of
domestic high-tech industries would consequently mean a lack
of positions for new employees and a concomitant decline in
the talent pool.
Semiconductors will continue to play an ever increasing
role in all types of manufacturing processes. As artificial
intelligence and robotics become increasingly capable, more
and more industries, not only the electronics industry, will
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utilize their technologies. The heart of Al/robotics will
continue to be the semiconductor and its ability to rapidly
absorb and transmit massive amounts of information.
Assuming the logic behind the arguments for a strong
domestic semiconductor production capability, what
recommendations did the Defense Science Board make and what
actions did Congress finally take?
F. THE SEMA.TECH PROPOSAL
To reverse the trend of a decreasing U.S. semiconductor
market share, the DSB recommended that the Department of
Defense subsidize creation of a consortium of private firms
designed to study and create new manufacturing technologies
for the semiconductor industry, particularly for the next
generation DRAM chips. The output of this combined R&D
effort would initially be made available to the member
firms, and later, to the entire industry. An infusion of
approximately $200 million/year for a total of six years was
the initial mandate. This was thought to provide enough
impetus to the industry to see it through to its initial
goal of producing a 64-MP DRAM chip and transferring this
technology to member firms. It was felt that a specific
goal (the 64 MB chip) would focus R&D efforts as well as
allow sufficient quantification in order to monitor goal
5 9
attainment. At the end of the six years, federal
involvement would essentially cease and SEMATECH would
continue only insofar as member firms continued to finance
its existence.
A primary concern of SEMATECH would be the
discovery/implementation of techniques to transfer the
technology it developed to its member firms; not a small
task in that all member firms are fiercely competitive
outside of the consortium environment. SEMATECH has devised
what it calls "transfer teams": individuals from each member
firm who are trained, during group sessions, on how best to
return the technology developed to their parent firm. It is
also thought that the organizational culture engendered by
SEMATECH will promote open and frank communication. Hence,
additional transfer methods will exist simply because of the
professionalism resident in the employees themselves. In
addition, SEMATECH has developed a common format and
language to complement training of transfer teams as well as
common processing and qualification database languages.
Each of these steps will necessarily reduce misunderstanding
and speed communication; however, only time will really tell
if they are a success.
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1 . SEMJITECH Strategies and Tactics
Based on personal interviews with SEMATECH
personnel, the organization has devised from its charter a
number of specific and general strategies and tactics to
achieve the goals envisioned. These are formed around the
basic premise that SEMATECH was formed to strengthen
America's capability to manufacture semiconductors with
totally domestic production content. [Ref. 14]
These strategies include:
- implementation of programs to develop/demonstrate
advanced semiconductor manufacturing techniques;
- demonstrating cost effective manufacturing capability
on competitive, leading-edge manufacturing
demonstration vehicles;
- transferring technology developed to member firms and
ultimately to all domestic semiconductor firms.
Tactics developed to implement these strategies
include the following:
- periodic group workshops to plan goals and milestones
for each step of the process;
- demonstrating manufacturability of each unit process
and manufacturing system on appropriate production
lines;
- building a generic manufacturing plant for use as a
laboratory to demonstrate processes developed;
- emphasizing environmental, health and safety
considerations in the development of state-of-the-art
manufacturing processes with regard to hazardous
materials, effluents and waste;
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- utilizing only U.S. -owned, U.S. located suppliers of
equipment and materials;
- providing coordination for academic research in eight
major universities throughout the country to complement
SEMATECH's hands-on R&D;
- utilizing outside sources as much as possible for
specification of standards, selecting vendors, and co-
development of all required systems in place of
SEMATECH personnel.
2 . Funding
As mentioned earlier, the estimated operating budget
for SEMATECH is $200 million per year. Fifty percent of
this comes from the Department of Defense, via DARPA
(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) . The other half
if raised by annual dues required of member firms.
Currently 13 firms comprise the core body of SEMATECH. Each
of these firms pays a minimum of $1 million annually, with
many paying more depending on whether they are a merchant or
captive producer, end-user, or non-semiconductor member. In
addition, each SEMATECH member must agree to join the
Semiconductor Research Corp (SRC) , which has its own
separate dues ranging from $65,000 to $2.4 million,
depending on company size, plus a one-time sign-up fee of
$62,000.
Therefore, member fees are not solely constrained to
the $1 million minimum required by SEMATECH. They may be
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closer to $2 million. [Ref. 15:pp. 30-34] For small,
upstart companies these fees may be prohibitive.
3 . En^loyees
At the onset, employees of SEMATECH came from each
of the individual member firms in order to facilitate start
up and lend experience in the technical and leadership
areas. As time progresses, SEMATECH expects to direct hire
approximately 50% of its employees, with the remainder
consisting of loaners from the member firms. Each firm
assigns individuals based on the proportion of funding it is
providing, up to a ceiling of 10% of the total. Salaries
are provided by the individuals' parent firm while assigned
to SEMATECH, although this amount is credited to the firm's
account when assessed its annual membership fees.
4 . Mexober Firms
As of May 1989, SEMATECH consisted of 14


















The network that SEMATECH has developed does not, of
course, end here. Several dozen other supplier companies
provide basic components to SEMATECH. One of the most
critical of these is Monsanto' s Electronics Materials
Company (MEMO), based in Palo Alto, CA. MEMO is the U.S.'
sole producer of 8-inch silicon wafers, which are the basic
cutting blocks from which semiconductors are produced.
SEMATECH plans to rely upon MEMC's 8-inch wafers because it
is the only domestic producer of this raw component.
The problem which has now developed, however, is
that as of April 1, 1989, MEMC is owned by a foreign firm,
Heuls AG of West Germany. This would seem to run counter to
SEMATECH' s basic premise of utilizing only domestic
suppliers. In allowing the sale of MEMC to the West
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Germans, the Bush Administration heedGd the recommendations
of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS)
which agreed that "the Heuls acquisition represents the best
opportunity to strengthen this business and provide a strong
manufacturing base and research and development effort in
the United States." [Ref. 16 :p. 1]. Apparently an exception
would be made to the rule of domestic-location, domestic-
ownership. It can only be theorized that CFIUS felt this
particular sale would cause no national security problems in
the area of restricted supplies. An apparent loophole in
this requirement is that foreign-owned suppliers are not
eligible to participate in SEMATECH if an American-owned
producer is available. Obviously, there is no other
American-owned producer of 8-inch wafers, therefore,
inclusion of MEMC in the SEMATECH organization is
legitimate. However, this raises basic questions as to the
future reliability of such a policy of foreign exclusion.
Where in fact do you draw the line? What happens when
Hitachi buys out a major American producer? Is it allowed
to continue as a SE^4ATECH supplier? Adequate evaluation of
possible long-term implications are required.
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5. SEMA.TECH Accomplishments
As Stated in its own words, SEMATECH'
s
accomplishments since inception have been numerous. These
include
:
- ability to construct cost-effective, world-class
fabrication facilities capable of manufacturing 0.5
micron technology;
- production of 64K Static Random Access Memory (SRAM)
chips;
- completion of 27 different workshops throughout the
country to focus specific technological targets;
- organizing the relationship between DARPA and SEMATECH
in the face of legal issues such as antitrust,
taxation, proprietary rights, etc.;
- coordinating the foundation of Centers of Excellence at
six American universities to study specific topics:
Contamination/Defect control. Lithography and Pattern
Transfer, Single Wafer Processing, Plasma Processes, On-
Line Analysis and Metrology, and Sub-Micron CMOS. In
addition to these research areas, each university
agreed to develop curricula to emphasize manufacturing
disciplines at the graduate and undergraduate levels;
- establishment of Semi /SEMATECH. Members of
Semi/SEMATECH are suppliers of materials vital to
SEMATECH' s R&D efforts. Mainly small businesses,
membership permits these firms to receive timely
notification of SEMATECH developed initiatives and
standards for incorporation into their own production
lines
.
6. DOD and SEMA.TECH
While DOD has the already mentioned objective of
ensuring the long-term viability of the domestic
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semiconductor industry, SEMATECH literature also states the
following as having potential DOD value:
- because SEMATECH is a unique organizational form for
American industry and government, its success could
facilitate future innovative industry/DOD efforts that
avoid the costly DOD procurement procedures;
- factory modernization will ensue from enhanced
production technology;
- R&D tends to be stable since membership is required for
a minimum of four years precluding premature loss of
funding by dissatisfied firms;
- increased DOD savings due to emphasis on lowering
manufacturing costs;
- quality control is a prime requirement for any
technology developed, minimizing the need for extensive
after-production testing;
- reduced need for DOD defense specifications and special
processes in manufacturing due to SEMATECH' s emphasis
on generic technology;




SEMATECH certainly possesses the normal risks
associated with any new, unknown organization--success or
failure are not guaranteed. However, this is not a unique
situation. More specific potential problems and their risks
will be:
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Rate of Diffusion of Developed Technology. Slow rate
of transfer of technology will cause technology to be
outdated before its use. Statistics bear out the fact
that leading-edge technology is oftentimes outmoded
after 6-12 months of use. On the other hand, a too
rapid rate of diffusion might imply utilization by
foreign competitors, thereby undermining the basic
reason for SEMATECH's creation. In addition, U.S. firms
with access to SEMATECH produced technology might
decide to incorporate this technology in their overseas
facilities with possible spread to competitive,
foreign-owned firms. Even if foreign-owned firms do
not acquire timely technology, the foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. firms might be given these advanced
manufacturing techniques, thereby further exacerbating
the movement of the semiconductor industry to foreign
shores;
Collusion. SEMATECH member firms might decide to try
and corner the market on technology developed in the
consortium. This would certainly lead to advantages
for member firms. However, the SEMATECH charter
requires developed technology to be made available to
nonmember firms after a sufficient period of time
(through royalty fees). Theoretically, collusion
should not occur;
Centralization of Research Agenda. Innovation by
individual firms on non-agenda research will tend to be
very difficult. Diversity tends to be lost in order to
avoid research duplication;
Organizational Riskiness. Due to the limited level of
experience in the U.S. with consortium arrangements,
historical precedence cannot be counted upon to
extrapolate possible conclusions;
Involvement of federal government. Federal
participation is currently limited to funding and
providing advice to management. However, there is
always the possibility that should SEI4ATECH either fall
behind schedule or fail to meet required milestones,
the Federal Government could step in and dictate policy
to protect its vested interest in SEMATECH' s success.
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G. INDUSTRY/GOVERNMENT OPINIONS AND VIEWPOINTS REGARDING
SEMATECH
From the onset, SEMATECH has had its proponents and
critics. A review of the literature brings forth a wide
spectrum of opinions, often with contradictory facts and
conclusions based on extrapolated data from various sources.
The following is a brief synopsis of the general cross-
section of industry, government and academic writings
regarding SEMATECH and its espoused goals.
H . PROPONENTS
Jon Cornell, senior vice president of Harris Corp'
s
Semiconductor Sector and a SEMATECH board member, believes
SEMATECH is the only choice U.S. chip makers have for
survival. Government involvement is essential, he states,
because "the semiconductor industry does not have the
resources to get the SEMATECH effort promptly underway and
keep it moving speedily towards its objectives". Cornell
indicates that the U.S. defense program and America's entire
industrial base is at risk if the dearth of domestic
semiconductor production capability is not addressed. The
concerns of smaller companies that SEMATECH' s focus and
membership costs are unrealistic is unfounded in Cornell's
opinion. Not all small companies need to participate in
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such an endeavor, he says, but if they do, the fees are an
investment in a highly leveraged opportunity. A small
member firm would realize a multiplier effect in its R&D
capability by joining SEMATECH, Cornell believes. Cornell
states that SEMATECH is probably the only means for the
industry to survive at this point, even though cooperation
between firms competing for the same technology is
unnatural. Entrepreneurship will not carry this industry
into the future by itself. [Ref. 17:pp. 11-13]
Charles Sporck, president of National Semiconductor
Corp, was one of the earliest lobbyists for government-
industry collaboration and the chief architect of the
SEMATECH concept. Sporck believes that only an organization
like SEMATECH can infuse the industry with the required
amounts of funds to devise techniques for manufacturing
tomorrow' s superchips . Sporck' s tactic in convincing
reluctant Administration officials to take this path was a
warning that the Reagan Administration had to make a
difficult choice: either a strong economy or free trade.
Sporck believes that free trade is at the root of America's
economic woes. "No country can tolerate open markets if
that means losing its most advanced technology and its
ability to sustain its standard of living", declared Sporck.
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He believes the long-term solution should be managed trade,
in line with the 1986 semiconductor trade agreement with
Japan. However, with lack of a clear consensus on such a
radical economic approach, SEMA.TECH is the best alternative,
he believes. [Ref. 18:p. 116A]
Gilbert Amelio, president of Rockwell's
Semiconductor Products Division, states, "Their (the
Japanese) strategy was intentionally devised to overwhelm
anything that private industry can do by itself". This was
in response to the comment that for two decades the Japanese
model of industry-government collaboration has targeted and
then dominated selected markets such as compact cars,
cameras and consumer electronics. According to Amelio,
SEMATECH is the latest move by domestic chipmakers to fight
back against devastating competition from Japan Inc (Japan
Inc is the term used for the conglomeration of large
Japanese firms and Japanese government supports backing
these firms) . Amelio counters critics' arguments that
American industry will never be able to successfully
cooperate on such a large scale with the fact that firms
came to him with pledges of financial support even before he
solicited them. Amelio was president of the Semiconductor
Industry Association (SIA) , SEMATECH' s parent organization,
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at the time. He believes patriotism has been aroused and
that this groundswell of support will overcome parochial
jealousies. [Ref. 19:pp. 62-63]
George Schneer, a vice president for Intel
Corporation, states that "The U.S. semiconductor industry is
basically at the brink of starvation because of a lack of
manufacturing competitiveness". He explains that U.S. chip
companies have fallen anywhere from three to five years
behind their Japanese counterparts and that this has been
particularly devastating in the commodity markets, where
manufacturing is crucial. [Ref. 15:pp. 30-34]
Andy Grove, CEO of Intel, discounts the once
perceived problem of Japanese "dumping" of chips on the
American market, "...the American computer industry is not
at a disadvantage because of the suitcase (dumping)
problem) . The biggest danger the computer industry faces is
the disappearance of its principal domestic supplier. In
fact, the U.S. computers would be in mortal danger if
American semiconductors were destroyed". He goes on to
state that "The industry has become very brutal, very
heavily financed by every government - ours being the last
to get involved." "The Sematech consortium is a way for the
industry to support its suppliers by defining clear targets
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to shoot after, so that we do not, in turn, get too
dependent on overseas vendors for manufacturing tools.
Members will get a degree of security for development and
direction." [Ref. 20:pp. 43-45]
Bob Noyce, co-founder of Intel and CEO of SEMATECH, is
aware of the difficulties inherent in organizing SEMATECH to
overtake Japanese IC production. However, he indicates that
if successful, SEMATECH will probably set the pattern for
future government-industry endeavors, "What we've seen in
the Japanese model is that a consensual society can do some
things better than a strongly competitive society". [Ref.
21:pp. 76-79]
I. JAPANESE INTEREST
Japanese firms, for obvious reasons, are closely
scrutinizing SEMATECH' s progress as well. Expectations are
that SEMATECH will likely endanger Japan's superiority in
memory chip production. In addition, it is believed that
this portents increasing difficulty in obtaining U.S.
technology which is crucial to the design of basic software
that determines the functions of semiconductors, especially
memory chips (Texas Instruments provides many of the basic
designs) . It is foreseen that Japanese chipmakers will no
longer be able to rely on their superior and more efficient
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production techniques. Rather, they will have to strive for
basic improvements in circuit design and software issues.
[Ref. 22:p. 1066]
J. OPPONENTS
While the above opinions are essentially pro-SEMATECH,
there were a number of misgivings as well. One issue was
the apparent lack of support SEMATECH was receiving from the
numerous small chip makers. Zilog Corporation's Ed Sack
believes, "...SEMATECH is missing the point". Cypress
Semiconductor's T.J. Rodgers thinks that SEMATECH is nothing
more than a plot by the large firms to "...take care of
their real competition: the smaller firms." "It's going to
be hard to take the market away from the Japanese, where
they are doing well, and it is dumb for the government to
undertake it. Our Strategy (at Cyprus Semiconductor) is to
stay where we are strong. And that is in innovative design
and quick, value-added marketing", he adds. Others seem to
be indifferent, such as Gordon Campbell of Chips and
Technologies, Inc., who say, "We don't care very much about
manufacturing.", he adds. Even Charles Sporck acknowledges
the divergence in success between large and small firms:
the large ones declining in power, while the small, upstart
firms are increasingly capturing the next generation of
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technology, particularly through their use of customized
chips. Most of these innovators do not plan to participate
in SEMATECH, which could, in the long run, undermine
SEMATECH's ability to produce state-of-the-art technology.
Larry Jordan of Integrated Device Technology Inc., also
strongly objects to joining SEMATECH, "We are not able to
realize any gains from industry associations. We run at the
front edge of technology now. ...We're ahead of everyone
else." Tom Longo of Performance Semiconductor Inc., feels
that, "We'll end up giving away more than we are getting."
Even the basic direction of SEMATECH is cause for
concern by some. Zilog' s president. Sack, believes SEMATECH
"is not a decisive element in the solution to the problem we
are facing." He argues that manufacturing is not the
issue, rather the lack of vertical integration which causes
poor return on capital
.
Others fear government involvement, no matter how non-
intrusive. "If government funding means government
management, then I have a problem with that", states
Performance Semiconductor's Longo. Federal involvement,
specifically DOD, is even thought by some to be a major
cause of American loss of competitiveness. Scholars
interject that military spending has siphoned off large
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numbers of engineers and scientists to work on defense-
related projects (missiles, high-energy lasers) at the
expense of commercial products like VCRs, printers, etc
where the Japanese concentrated their efforts. "It's not
DARPA' s mission to provide aid to industry", says Michael
Borrus, Deputy Director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the
International Economy at UC Berkeley. Even more to the
point is Brookings Institution senior fellow, Kenneth Flamm,
who believes civilian industry should be supporting the
Pentagon, not the other way around. "Some of those national
security rationalizations are just that—rationalizations",
he says [Ref. 23:p. 8],
In defense of DARPA, however, it must be stated that
historical precedence seems to be in its favor. DARPA has
long been the leading provider of Federal funds to
universities for computer research. In fact, many
fundamental computer technologies in use today can be traced
to its backing, such as the graphics techniques used in the
Apple Macintosh, time-sharing, and packet-switching used in
local area networks. With these kinds of success stories







Concerns over probable technology loss are also
issues confronting SEMATECH. Critics argue that SEMATECH'
s
edge will diminish as developed technology leaves the
organization via member firms' offshore facilities, direct
deals between member firms and foreign firms, and
resignation of employees with access to the latest
technology. Mechanisms to ensure adequate domestic
harvesting of data may or may not be possible.
2. Is SEMATECH' s Emphasis Correct?
Arguments espousing a different direction than that
taken by SEMATECH merit further consideration. SEMATECH
currently focuses on the memory-chip market, one which Japan
clearly dominates, and where Japan appears to enjoy
comparative advantage over the U.S.. From a commercial
viewpoint, it might make more sense for DOD to strengthen
markets where domestic industry already has the lead: low
volume, high-performance products. These also tend to be
where the military requirements are found--customized
designs in low volume.
77
L. OTHER GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED PROGRAMS
Outcomes of government support programs for other
declining domestic industries might provide clues as to the
viability of SEMATECH. Recent voluntary restraint
agreements (VRAs) designed to give domestic auto and steel
industries a chance to adjust to increased foreign
competition have done little to reverse the declining U.S.
market share. While temporary improvements occurred in the
auto industry (imports dropped to 23% at the height of the
VRA period), they rebounded to 29% upon completion. [Ref.
24 :p. 50] The steel industry's actions are equally as
dismal. Even after the 1984 Steel Import Stabilization Act,
carbon and specialty steel shipments continue to decline, as
do profits and employment. The more nebulous areas of R&D,
where SEMATECH is focused, might be even more difficult to
guarantee success based on the results of these latest
government endeavors.
Governmental involvement in the VHSIC project also shows
a possible scenario for SEMATECH. The very high speed
integrated circuit program was developed to design
radiation-resistant microelectronics technology and
production capabilities. While a 1986 Office of Technology
Assessment report indicated attainment of basic goals, the
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actual production line establishment fell well short of
requirement and delays of up to a year occurred due to
unrealistic goals. It might be possible that similar
delays will occur when SEMATECH's member firms attempt to
apply to high-volume production lines the medium-volume
techniques developed at SEMATECH. In the dynamic
environment of semiconductors, after a 6-12 month delay,
technology may already be outdated. [Ref. 24 :p. 51]
M. SBMATECH: CAM IT WORK?
As can be discerned from the myriad of opinions, alleged
facts, and precedence, a likely outcome of the SEMATECH
project will be difficult to predict at best. So-called
experts on both ends of the spectrum hold strongly to the
viability or the foolishness of such an organization. What
is clear, however, is that several issues have not been
addressed satisfactorily. Are the goals too ambitious? Did
the Defense Science Board, which recommended the SEMATECH
proposal, adequately consider alternatives? Is the national
security reasoning employed by industry executives an actual
threat in today's interdependent world or merely a ruse to
gain political leverage? Is American corporate culture even
able to assimilate the radical concept of competitive
cooperation or will individualism present problems?
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Japanese society tends to be efficient, diligent and
homogenous. American society in many ways is unique and
draws it previous successes on the concept of
entrepreneurship. Is it realistic to think that the
Japanese model will be assimilated into the American scheme
as easily as SEMATECH would propose?
These and other points will be analyzed as to their
merits and possible deficiencies in the final two chapters.
Possible outcomes and predictions will be detailed in the
concluding chapter. While no definitive answer may be
possible, one can theorize with a fair degree of confidence
some possible scenarios and their likely solutions.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
As mentioned previously, several points deserve special
investigation when considering both the intent in
establishing SEMATECH as well as the long-term viability of
such an organization. These include the rationale behind
national security implications, possible alternatives
satisfying DOD fears, and both the short and long-term
viability of SEMATECH' s organizational structure itself.
Each has merits which may have influenced the ultimate
decision to form SEMATECH or which may provide clues to
SEMATECH' s future.
A. SEMICONDUCTOR/NATIONAL SECURITY OVERLAP?
Do current trends in the semiconductor industry pose
national security risks? In other words, is national
security really jeopardized if a majority of the
semiconductors used in defense products come from foreign
sources?
The U.S. has been involved in several international
conflicts in recent years (Lebanon, Grenada, Persian Gulf,
Libya) . While these were relatively short duration
conflicts, there have never been any repercussions or
81
restrictions of vital foreign-sourced weapons components.
Does this mean such restrictions could never happen?
Obviously not; however, the interdependence of military
cooperation between the main chip suppliers such as Japan
and the European community, and the U.S. military, is
substantial
.
Until recently, even the Pentagon itself appeared
unconcerned with the implications of foreign-produced
electronics. As an example, in 1986, either to cut costs or
reward its allies, the U.S. awarded more than $9 billion
worth of contracts to foreign firms—approximately 6% of
total procurement. [Ref. 24 :p. 47] In October of that same
year, the Air Force purchased a major weather tracking and
flight scheduling computer system of foreign origin. While
the company may have been American (Honeywell), the system
itself utilized mainly NEC (Nippon Electric Corporation)
supplied semiconductors, processors, and circuitry.
B. CONFLICTING RESPONSES
An interesting example of what might be an underlying
reason for the semiconductor industry emphasis on national
security is the attempted Fairchild-Fu jitsu sale.
In late 1986, Fujitsu revealed plans to purchase 80% of
Fairchild Semiconductor. At that time, Fairchild was the
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second largest supplier of chips to the U.S. military.
Since these chips were used for advanced computers, military
systems and nuclear-weapons communication systems, both
industry officials and politicians alike claimed a potential
national security risk if Japanese control were permitted.
Politicians, in particular, decried the loss of jobs they
believed would occur and possible antitrust violations which
would ensue. Finally, after it saw the writing on the wall,
Fujitsu withdrew its offer.
Was the takeover bid indeed a threat to national
security? Over 95% of the products provided by Fairchild to
DOD were available from other domestic producers. Also, the
loss of jobs issue might not, in fact, have occurred at all.
Fairchild had been doing so poorly in the previous seven
years that it had already laid off 20,000 employees. The
infusion of fresh capital by Fujitsu might even have
increased employment.
As it turned out, National Semiconductor subsequently
purchased Fairchild for a fraction of the Fujitsu offer.
Due to this merger. National Semiconductor became the 6th
largest semiconductor manufacturer in the world, thereby
increasing its own potential for antitrust violations.
However, the semiconductor industry historically has been
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calling these antitrust rules too strict, not lax, thereby
inhibiting cooperative R&D ventures.
Finally, why was there not a national security outcry in
1979 when Fairchild was purchased by the French-owned
company, Schlumberger Corporation? Is there a double
standard or do the semiconductor industry and Congress
really feel that they have nothing to fear from French
dissatisfaction with U.S. foreign policy? Robert
Christopher, author of Second to None: American Companies
in Japan, notes that "Any suggestion that the French are
more responsive to American defense concerns than are the
Japanese is patently absurd." [Ref. 24 :p. 49]
There are also misgivings as to the validity of the
statistics used to show America's overall decline in
semiconductor production. While the Japanese have made
substantial increases in certain areas of the chip market,
notably in the low-profit, high-volume commodity-chip field,
this amounts to only about 15% of the total U.S. market for
semiconductors. Even this figure may still be misleading
since it does not include domestic captive producers such as
AT&T and IBM. Including these two firms alone, the U.S.
world market share rises from 44% to about 57%. [Ref. 25 :p.
9]
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In particular, the Japanese only lead the U.S. in
production of the DRAM at this stage. This is the most
basic and commonly produced type of chip and demand
fluctuates, sometimes drastically, for it. In 1986, the top
five Japanese DRAM chipmakers--Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi,
NEC, and Fujitsu—had drops in profit of from 50% to 80%.
On the other hand, as earlier noted, U.S. firms have
substantial leads in the specialty chip market and next
generation chips. Some industry analysts even feel that the
Japanese may have made a strategic mistake by concentrating
so heavily on this one aspect of the semiconductor industry,
DRAMS, at the expense of future changes in technology. [Ref.
25:p. 10]
It is also interesting to note that those firms crying
the loudest when the specter of Japanese dumping occurred in
1985-86, were just those medium-sized firms whose main
impetus continued to remain in the DRAM market. Unable to
compete with the monolithic Japanese makers, these firms
lobbied and won approval from Congress for protectionist
legislation. Could it be that these firms had simply
"missed the boat" on what consumers desired and were trying
to protect their substantial capital investment? Charles
Sporck, CEO of National Semiconductor (one of the firms
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directly affected by the Japanese DRAM invasion)
,
became the
prime industry spokesman for government intervention via the
SEMATECH avenue and a vehement critic of the Japanese
intrusion into the U.S. market. His motives could have been
as much self-preserving as altruistic.
As it stands now, the world' s most profitable
semiconductor firms are the small start-ups who are focusing
on the limited production, but custom-made, chip. The trend
in electronics is toward smaller and smaller chips with more
densely packed transistors-more storage capability/chip, in
other words . It is not the chip manufacturing aspect which
holds the future, according to some analysts; rather, it is
the design of new, more sophisticated chips [Ref . 25 :p. 10]
.
This follows the trade pattern of product life cycle. As a
product becomes more standardized, firms find that less
developed countries may offer competitive advantages as
production locations. In other words, the production of
DRAM chips will best be performed in countries such as Korea
and Taiwan where labor costs are even lower than in Japan,
and certainly lower than in the U.S.. [Ref. 26:p. 202]
In particular, this emphasis would greatly benefit the
military whose weapons and other applications require custom
designs produced in low volume. It, therefore, is highly
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debatable as to whether SEMATECH' s espoused goal of
regaining the American lead in manufacturing technology for
national security reasons will even be valid in the future.
Could SEMATECH become a dinosaur even before its original 6-
year mandate is completed? Some think so.
C . CONCERNS
One of the prime concerns of the DSB, in recommending to
fund SEMATECH, was the belief that the semiconductor
industrial base should conform to a certain norm: domestic
ownership and domestic production. This means American
owners and production facilities physically located on U.S.
territory
.
Other possible scenarios where chips could enter the
merchant market are:
- foreign ownership, domestic production. In the auto
industry, Honda and other Japanese firms have plants
throughout the U.S..
- domestic ownership, foreign production. National
Semiconductor possesses this type of relationship in
Japan
.
- foreign ownership, foreign production. Obviously, this
is how a majority of the DRAM chips enter the U.S.
market
.
Why is the first scenario (domestic ownership/location)
the only acceptable alternative for defense critical chips?
For instance, it seems that the foreign ownership/domestic
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production scenario would be just as reasonable. If the
foreign owner was restricted by its government in selling
these components, the U.S. could still ensure supplies
through nationalization of the plant. While admittedly a
fairly radical solution, it does ensure open supply lines in
time of crisis. The Fu jitsu-Fairchild pact would have been
such a scenario. The Monsanto Electronics Materials Co.
relationship with SEMATECH is an example of just this type
of scenario, since MEMC is now German owned. Obviously,
DSB's desire to keep these firms solely domestic
owned/located is not being met. Perhaps unnecessary
limitations are being placed on the defense establishment by
restricting vital component suppliers to being domestically
owned/located
.
Another factor to consider is the differences in
technical edge required between the commodity market chip
and the specialty market chip. While the commodity market
chips do have a greater proportion of total market output,
the specialty chips, in fact, require technical superiority
in their design and production. Clearly, the technical edge
resides in the specialty chip market. Therefore, if DOD
derives its technical edge from these specialty chips, the
concern of losing U.S. ability to design, using these same
chips, is unwarranted. Specialty chip leadership, residing
in the U.S., seems to certainly lessen this aspect of the
DSB national security concerns.
D. ALTERNATIVES ASSUMING NATIONAL SECURITY RISK EXISTS
Several alternatives to SEMATECH, which may be less
expensive, yet continue to guarantee DOD's requirements for
semiconductors, are also possible. They may be less
glamorous, but equally as effective.
1 . Strategic Stockpiling
The Defense Science Board itself suggested one
possible scenario would be the strategic stockpiling of
semiconductors in the unlikely event of interruption. If
legitimate concerns arise concerning a possible prolonged
interruption, domestic captive producers (IBM, AT&T) could
be designated as back-up suppliers during a national
emergency
.
2 . Diversity of Foreign Sources
The very fact that numerous countries now produce
commodity chips itself is a safeguard, so to speak. It is
highly unlikely that the U.S. would go to war simultaneously
with Japan, Korea, Taiwan or Europe. In addition, there are
prospects of further commodity chip production in countries
such as Brazil. If the U.S. continued to cultivate
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relationships with a diversity of foreign suppliers, a total
cutoff of commodity chips to DOD during war, or simultaneous
political disagreement with several of theses nations,
would, in all likelihood, never occur.
3 . Buy American
Another alternative suggested by historical
precedence might be the Buy American campaign of earlier
years. While this might have its attractions to labor
unions, domestic industries. Congress, etc., it is actually
better for DOD to seek the best, most cost effective,
technology wherever it can be found. If this happens to be
a foreign-owned firm, then so be it. This is especially
true in light of recent U.S. experiences with the steel and
auto industry where protected industries failed to upgrade
their own technology significantly. A requirement to buy
only American made products may, in fact, jeopardize the DOD
premise of technological superiority in countering an
opponent's numerical advantage. Additionally, Buy American
policies tend to drive defense costs up and reduce overall
foreign military sales. This exacerbates both government
and trade deficits. Therefore, while Buy American is an
alternative, it can lead to other problems. In reality, DOD
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should remain free to scan the entire international market,
for both best technology, and best economy.
4 . International Agreements
Even while SEMATECH is ongoing, member firms
continue, in their best interest it must be said, to foster
joint ventures with major foreign peers. Examples include:
the Motorola and Toshiba pact; the National Semiconductor
and NMB Semiconductor (Japanese) agreement to design, make
and sell semiconductors in Japan; and the Honeywell, NEC and
Compagnie des Machines Bull of France supercomputer
cooperation pact. Advanced Micro Devices also has
agreements with both Sony (marketing and technology) and
West Germany's Siemens Corporation (sourcing)
.
What these pacts provide is a type of synergism and
symbiosis. In particular, the 1986 Semiconductor Protection
Act provided even more impetus for U.S. /foreign cooperation.
The pact encouraged more and more Japanese companies to
locate plants in the U.S. to avoid tariffs to their U.S.
customers, while joint ventures in Japan allow U.S. firms to
gain access to valuable manufacturing technology. In
addition, it is unlikely that Japan will move to restrict
these arrangements themselves or to restrict export of
crucial components made either jointly or solely by domestic
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firms. Japan relies extensively on U.S. military protection
because of its constitutional restrictions on military
spending. The U.S. is also the source of most leading-edge
chip and software technology. Therefore, it can be
considered to be in Japan's self-interest to provide the
most reliable components to the U.S. commercial and military
markets. Does this mean they always will? Perhaps not, but
the risk they would incur makes the alternative unlikely at
best. One-on-one international cooperative ventures,
therefore, provide stability in and of themselves to the
semiconductor industry and tend to ensure a steady flow of
chips for domestic requirements.
5 . Captive Producers
As mentioned earlier, the domestic, captive market
segment is quite sizable. IBM and AT&T could easily provide
all the DOD requirements for commodity chips if needed in an
emergency. So long as captive producers exist, and there is
no reason to believe that IBM will rely on outside sources
for its chips, DOD currently has in place a domestically
owned and domestically located supplier.
6 . Advanced Chip Programs
DOD could sponsor specific firms to develop and
produce both specialty and commodity chips for its own use.
92
While DOD itself is not an economic factor to the total
semiconductor industry, it certainly could be to individual
firms, if the majority of their contracts were to be
government oriented.
The point behind listing these possible alternatives is
to show that alternatives do exist. SEMATECH does not have
to be the only means of ensuring a continual flow of
defense-critical semiconductors. The argument that because
foreign-owned semiconductor firms currently dominate the
commodity chip merchant market, then national security must
be imperiled, is much too narrow-minded and simplistic in
today's interconnected and interdependent world.
E. VIABILITY OF THE ORGANIZATION
The question of SEMATECH' s organizational form brings
short-run and long-run questions to mind. Unlike previous
R&D consortia, such as MCC, where not all member firms have
equal access to ongoing R&D, SEMATECH is structured under
the premise that all members be allowed and encouraged to
participate in all research. Since SEMATECH is under a 6-
year federally subsidized mandate, its plan of action, so to
speak, is scrutinized yearly by DARPA. This supposedly
ensures a continual focus on the goal of developing
technology to mass produce a 64MB DRAM by 1992. In the
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short-run, therefore, SEMATECH' s financial viability is
somewhat guaranteed. It cannot be totally guaranteed, of
course, because Congress could cut federal funding or member
firms could leave. Although to prevent this, member firms
must commit to a four-year financial period.
SEMATECH's short-run goals, however, are somewhat more
uncertain. This is due to two uncertainties: technical and
market. Technical uncertainty deals with the probability of
developing whatever technology SEMATECH envisions. There is
always a risk involved in R&D; however, with the numbers of
talented scientists from each member firm there is at least
a reasonable percentage of success here. Market
uncertainty, though, can be quite a different factor,
especially in an area where others seem to have comparative
advantages. Therefore, it is by no means assured that
SEMATECH's emphasis on re-taking the DRAM production lead
from the Japanese will be successful in light of the
Japanese comparative advantage.
In the long run, the critical question is what happens
after direct federal involvement ends? What are the
procedures for choosing R'&D projects? Interviews with
SEMATECH representatives indicate that much the same
produces that are in place currently will be continued.
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That is, periodic strategy sessions are held with
representatives from each firm and long-term decisions are
made via group consensus. Small firm and large alike are
given equal billing in this forum. Without the focusing
attention of the initial 64MB DRAM goal, problems may indeed
arise between firms whose long-term vision and on-going
internal R&D Programs do not match. This could bode poorly
for future viability. Japan's MITI, while not always
successful, provides funding efforts focused on a specific
goal. Once this specific goal is achieved, the MITI-
sponsored cooperative pact is disbanded. The member firms
do not continue on their own initiative.
SEMATECH expects to remain a productive entity in spite
of the potential problems described. Realistic? Probably
not, but that is a risk the individual firms will need to
assess when conflicts arise. By this time, the Federal side
of SEMATECH will presumably be over.
F. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, is SEMATECH the best way for the
U.S. taxpayer to spend $100 million/year for six years? For
the following reasons, gleaned for the arguments for and
against SEMATECH as already stated, there is reason for
skepticism.
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Does Japanese superiority in DRAM production pose a
national security risk? No evidence, historical or
otherwise, indicates that our strongest allies will
restrict militarily-important industrial components.
Besides, there are mechanisms available to ensure
adequate short-term, and probably long-term, supplies
in case of a crisis (via captive producers, for
instance)
;
Are SEMATECH's goals properly focused? While the 64MB
DRAM certainly has numerous potential payoffs, it is
competing directly with Japan in an area where Japan
seems to have developed a comparative advantage through
its years of experience in this field. Federal funding
might be better directed toward quantum-leap
technology, in areas where no particular nation has yet
achieved superiority, in order to receive adequate
payback for its investment;
Is DOD the appropriate sponsor for SEMATECH? DOD has
no inherent responsibility for the commercial viability
of the semiconductor industry. As it currently stands,
the $100 million annual federal support comes solely
from the DOD budget, ultimately at the expense of other
projects. Because of its commercial focus, SEMATECH
might more naturally be sponsored by a commercially
oriented agency such as the Department of Commerce.
Furthermore, SEMATECH should not preclude investment by
DOD in more directly beneficial areas;
Is SEMATECH directed at the proper market segment?
American industrial strength, historically, has been
especially viable in the entrepreneurial setting. The
U.S. does not need to worry about the relatively low-
tech DRAM and the dominance by foreign firms in this
field. The fact that other countries are able to
produce commodity chips at a comparative advantage to
the U.S. simply indicates DRAMs are in the mature,
standardized product life cycle stage. This is a
normal and expected evolution of all products. [Ref.
26:p. 201]
Federal funding might be better used to combat the
dearth in scientific and other technical majors in the
educational system. Ultimately, these graduates will
continue to expand the horizon of the scientific world
through commercial entrepreneurial and leading edge
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firms. The small start-up semiconductor firms who
specialize in customized chips have the highest profit
margin and are the most successful section of the
entire world-wide semiconductor industry. Creativity
and innovation is what needs to be subsidized, not mass
production of already established techniques;
SEMATECH's long-term viability is uncertain. After
attainment of successful 64MB DRAM production, it may
become difficult to find agreement between the large
and small member firms. Their respective focus may be
on different segments of the semiconductor industry.
In addition, many member firms may have strong internal
R&D capabilities. This increases the problem of
setting long-term goals because member firms will want
consortium projects to complement, not duplicate, their
on-going internal projects. Furthermore, firms with
the strongest internal R&D capabilities may be
hesitant to share their talents with those firms that
have weaker (or no) internal programs.
The U.S. may have to accept the internationalization of
high technology as a given. America is no longer
living in a world where her preeminence is guaranteed.
Cooperation among technologically advanced nations may
have to be more pronounced. Protectionism will only
tend to inhibit the mutual benefits of utilizing each
other' s specific skills toward producing a common
product; a product which neither one might be able to
manufacture on its own.
G. PERCEPTIONS
While the semiconductor industry in the U.S. has its ups
and downs, it essentially is no different than any other
industry. Some segments of it are stronger than others.
SEMATECH concentrates on one such segment: the low-profit,
high-volume commodity chip production market. Can and
should we save this segment, or should we concentrate on
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segments where we have a comparative advantage? More
fundamentally, is the threat real or perceived? Is the
situation the semiconductor industry finds itself in a
natural trade pattern in the product life cycle? SEMATECH
was proposed, after all, as the best solution to counter
this perceived Japanese threat to the U.S. semiconductor
industry
.
SEMATECH' s short-run viability depends on whether the
U.S. can and should salvage a market segment where Japan and
others (Korea, Taiwan, etc) appear to have developed a
comparative advantage. SEMATECH' s long-run viability
depends on its ability to coordinate the diverse interests
of its members. The national security benefit depends on
the importance of retaining a domestic merchant capability
in low-profit, high-volume commodity chips and on SEMATECH
as the best alternative for maintaining this capability.
Encouraging a free and open market for entrepreneurs,
our real strength, and funding education programs to
replenish the scientific community would seem to go much
further, in the long run, in ensuring America's high
technology leadership throughout the world.
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VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
There are a number of areas for in-depth study related
to the issues raised in this thesis. While certainly not
all inclusive, the following questions may be of particular
interest for continued research:
- What are the relationships between the smaller member
firms of SEMATECH and their larger peers?
- What are the prospects for SE^4ATECH long-term
viability?
- To what extent does DOD relay on low-profit, high-
volume commodity chips in its weapons systems?
- What is the link between nationals security and the
domestic industrial base? To what extent will
technical leadership or mobilization affect this link?
- If it is determined that DOD should relay more on the
allied defense base, then which products and which
countries should be permitted entry into the U.S.
defense market?
- Which products should retain a domestic production
capability and how should this be accomplished?
- What past experience does the U.S. have with the other
protectionist policies as they relate to defense
products (i.e., antidumping, Buy American, etc)?
- What circumstances (industry structure, R&D level)
appear most conducive to utilizing a consortium as
opposed to another organizational form?
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What is the appropriate type of consortium for meeting
these circumstances (i.e., university oriented,
centralized, independent, etc)?
How is technology transferred most effectively? How is
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